Regional and global militaries face challenges and dangers in standing up to China’s increasingly aggressive military tactics. Many countries understand that the benefits of a rules-based international order outweigh the costs and are committed to trying to protect rules and norms that have underpinned regional prosperity for decades. However, to date, few actions have slowed or abated China’s momentum in seeking to reshape that regional order.

Since 2013, the PRC has conducted large-scale land reclamation and established several military installations in the South China Sea. Its military has increased its presence and exercises around Taiwan, and there have been a growing number of military incursions into the sovereign territory and exclusive jurisdiction of others. As this website demonstrates, there are now regular reports of unsafe maritime and air incidents.

Below are three policy options that would assist militaries in pushing back against Xi’s ambitions to reshape the regional order in China’s favour.

China’s global propaganda machine is often highly effective at distorting facts on the ground. Beijing seeks to disguise the aggressive nature of its military actions and punish those who speak out against its illegitimate activities. The PRC recognises the value of using all arms of the Chinese party-state to support its global propaganda efforts.

The Philippines has demonstrated, with some success, the value of transparency in countering Beijing’s aggressive tactics and its propaganda. Under President Marcos, Manila has cast light on the tactics used by China to coerce Filipino military, paramilitary and civilian vessels in the South China Sea. To date, the transparency initiative hasn’t radically altered China’s approach, but it’s been successful in mobilising domestic and international support behind Marcos and his struggle against Beijing.

The US, Canada and France have also been more transparent in publicising their own respective challenges to China’s excessive claims. The US and Canada have publicly provided extensive details on unsafe actions by China’s military. That’s probably had some impact on Beijing’s calculus; Washington’s bulk release of information in October 2023 coincided with China subsequently adopting a more professional posture towards US military assets in the region.

Several countries in the region, including Australia, New Zealand and Japan, have all used their militaries to challenge China’s excessive claims, but provide little to no detail on when and where they conduct such challenges. It’s also difficult to determine whether details of all incidents are released or only the most brazen are disclosed (as those are difficult to supress, especially when there’s media coverage).

All countries that challenge the PRC’s excessive claims should release regular public statements to reinforce the importance of their military actions. Governments should also consider how they engage their publics; military releases often include technical and inaccessible language. Conversations should focus on what the military is doing and why. It’s also useful to note that most militaries have been operating in this region for decades without incident. Drawing attention to Beijing’s unsafe actions helps to underscore that it’s China’s behaviour that’s changing, not the behaviour of others.

Transparency undermines Beijing’s propaganda and can help to stall its regional momentum. Publicising military challenges draws attention to China’s excessive claims and its efforts to assert de facto control over other maritime zones.

Collective efforts, focused on specific issues, have demonstrated success in countering the PRC’s tactics. The US and other like-minded countries have taken greater steps to strengthen regional networks in recent years. Those include the creation of the Quad (US, India, Japan, Australia); the "SQUAD" (US, Japan, Australia and the Philippines); and a series of trilaterals including AUKUS (US, Australia, UK), US–Australia–Japan, US – South Korea – Japan and US–Japan–Philippines.

Those so-called ‘minilaterals’ are typically task-oriented and more conducive to reaching consensus. That helps to overcome the shortcomings of large-scale multilateralism, which hasn’t always proved effective on defence and security issues.

For example, in 2024, Second Thomas Shoal became the most dangerous flashpoint in the South China Sea as Beijing forcibly tried to stop the Philippines resupplying its outpost. However, diplomatic and practical support provided to the Philippines by the US, Japan, Australia and others helped to alter Beijing’s momentum. China was faced with a deteriorating situation that it was unable to control. A compromise was agreed, which has, for the time being, helped to preserve a fragile status quo.

The PRC has responded negatively to minilateralism (further demonstrating the utility of that strategy), as it has to most democratic-led partnerships. Foreign affairs and defence spokespersons in Beijing regularly speak out against minilateralism, which they paint as the formation of ‘exclusive blocs along ideological lines’. Beijing is engaging regional countries through the framework of its Global Security Initiative, which is designed to offer alternative models for regional security that purposefully don’t involve the US or ‘exclusive cliques’.

The new US administration may create problems for minilateralism and policymakers. However, there are also opportunities to expand and strengthen regional minilateral frameworks. That includes engaging more with Indonesia and Vietnam outside of the ASEAN framework as they look to manage engagement with China in the South China Sea. European countries and the European Union have also demonstrated continued interest in Indo-Pacific security: more countries sent warships to the region in 2024 than in the past.

Once China has shifted the status quo, it’s very difficult to restore it. Following a stand-off in 2012, the PRC was able to seize the Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines. It now restricts access by Filipino fishermen and has reinforced its claims by illegitimately drawing straight baselines around the shoal.

The PRC’s tactics are designed to test political will. Once a country has been pushed back, even temporarily, Beijing will seek to capture the initiative and double down on its position. That tactic is embedded within the DNA of the CCP. China’s increasingly aggressive military tactics around the Paracel Islands, which now dissuade most militaries from operating in that area, are a further example of such behaviour.

China has also demonstrated its ability to influence defence and security outcomes by applying pressure in other areas of a bilateral relationship. From 2020 through to 2024, Beijing subjected Australia to economic coercion and diplomatic isolation, which, some have argued, has resulted in Canberra becoming silent and acquiescent on security issues in order to return to a more ‘stable’ bilateral relationship.

With all that in mind, governments must factor the long-term pattern of China’s military behaviour into their decision-making. This problem won’t get easier for policymakers or military personnel. It’s important to consider not only what’s happening now, but what might happen in the future as the PLA continues to evolve its military tactics and expand its reach.

Strategies to counter the PRC’s malign behaviour also need to be supported by a unified political approach. Consistent and principled behaviour by others presents Beijing with fewer easy options to achieve incremental advances. Regular and ongoing patterns of behaviour, such as freedom-of-navigation transits, provide a solid foundation for challenging China’s aggressive behaviour while reinforcing the importance of longstanding regional rules and norms.