To understand why China’s military has been acting in a more aggressive manner since late 2021, it’s important to understand the trajectory of China’s defence and foreign policy under President Xi Jinping.

In the 1980s, the PRC’s foreign policy was guided by the famous dictum of its then leader, Deng Xiaoping: ‘Hide your strength, bide your time (韬光养晦).’ For almost 40 years, China prioritised stability and cooperation in its foreign relations to support its dramatic domestic economic reform program. However, Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power within the CCP and China’s state and military has ushered in a new era of aggressive behaviour abroad. We see that, militarily, in the South China Sea, East China Sea and Yellow Sea as well as through a variety of other diplomatic, economic and military actions (that are beyond the scope of this website).

China’s dramatic transformation under Xi has arguably become the single most disruptive change to the Indo-Pacific region since World War II. The PRC is now seeking to ‘strive for achievement’ as Xi and the CCP seek to achieve the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, openly challenge the rules-based international order and offer alternative models for governance, development, security and even ‘civilisation’.

Xi’s China isn’t alone in its endeavour to up end the established order. According to US Government officials, we’re seeing a ‘certain transactional symbiosis’ between the autocratic regimes of Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang. That alignment emboldens Xi and reinforces his momentum in the Indo-Pacific region.

What does Xi want?

Xi Jinping seeks to achieve national rejuvenation and make China the pre-eminent global military and economic power. He’s encouraged by what he sees as the inexorable decline of the West. In recent essays and speeches, Xi has extolled the benefits of Chinese modernisation, presenting it as an alternative development model for other nations. According to Xi, the world is entering a new era in which the ‘the East is rising while the West is in decline’ and there’s ‘order in China versus chaos in the West’.

Within that context, Xi is looking to reshape global norms, rules and institutions that don’t support China’s ambitions. For example, the PRC has used selective interpretations of UNCLOS and the development of domestic laws to justify the expansion of its military footprint in the South China Sea.

While Xi understands that becoming the pre-eminent global power will take time, he has positioned himself as a leader for life by crushing dissent against his rule. There are few, if any, signals to indicate that he’ll slow or readjust his current trajectory.

Previously, the PLA lacked the experience, professionalism and capability to affect the regional or global order. At the same time, the US military long maintained a significant technological and capability advantage over the PLA. The US also shared its technology and supported the development of other advanced militaries in East Asia.

However, things have changed. China has been able to use its economic success to develop the PLA into a modern fighting force. Xi has invested significant energy into improving the professionalism of the military and invested resources into achieving technological advantage over the US in several critical areas.

Xi has purged senior generals to improve loyalty and set an example for others. He has removed defence ministers Li Shangfu and Dong Jun over corruption allegations and most recently Admiral Mao Hua, a senior member of China’s Central Military Commission, who’s been suspended and is under investigation for a ‘serious violation of discipline’.

Xi wants the PLA to ‘modernise’ by 2035 and make itself a ‘world class’ fighting force by 2049.

In 2025, China’s military has:

• the world’s largest active-duty military force, comprising approximately 2.035 million active, 510,000 reserve, and 500,000 paramilitary personnel for a total force of 3.045 million
• the world’s largest naval force of more than 370 ships and submarines and a high proportion of new vessels (70% of Chinese warships were launched after 2010, compared to a quarter of America’s)
• the largest aviation force in the Indo-Pacific region and soon to be the world’s largest air force
• a rapidly expanding modernised and diversified nuclear force, including a number of land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear-weapon delivery platforms
• a military–civil fusion development strategy, bringing together China’s defence base, civilian technology and industrial base for the benefit of the military.

Within the past two decades, the PLA has transformed from a fairly large but poorly trained and ill-equipped force into a regional military power with global ambitions.

Even during the period of ‘hiding and biding’, the PRC has always sought to use its military to protect its national interests abroad (中国海外利益保护). That dynamic has only accelerated under Xi’s leadership. He’s using the military more systematically as a tool of China’s foreign policy, including to threaten or deter China’s neighbours and other countries operating in the Indo-Pacific region.

Under Xi, the military has established several garrisons in the South China Sea. Military actions around Taiwan and beyond the ‘first island chain’ have increased. China’s military has come to physical blows with Indian troops in the Himalayas. The PLA has also increased joint exercises with Russia and established its first overseas base in Djibouti.

As Xi’s power has grown, so too has his confidence in using the military. Given the nature of centralised decision-making within the CCP, we wouldn’t be seeing military aggression and unsafe intercepts unless there were authorisation from central leadership. However, it’s difficult to confirm the true intentions of China’s leadership and military, as they’re famous for their lack of transparency, and China’s strict online censorship forbids most deep domestic discussions on defence and security issues. And, unlike other nations that publish long reports on their national interests and military developments, the PRC’s strategic documents are typically opaque and provide few clues. However, China’s latest Defence White Paper, released in 2019, provides a possible framework for what Xi is seeking to achieve by using aggressive tactics: 

Deterring and resisting aggression.

The White Paper places emphasis on the role of the military in defending and monitoring China’s territorial and peripheral airspace. Beijing’s maritime flank is surrounded by two crescent-shaped island chains that are littered with US allies and military bases. For years, the US has used that presence to operate close to China’s shores, including through frequent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations along China’s coastline. Beijing views the frequency and proximity of US military activities as unacceptably hostile. The PRC will want to limit and ultimately deter US military activity in its vicinity.

Safeguarding national sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security

The White Paper places emphasis on improving China’s ability to safeguard its territorial integrity, which encompasses the territory that it claims within the South China Sea. The PLA is taking active steps to challenge China’s neighbours, such as the Philippines, that have territorial claims to areas within China’s Nine-Dash Line. China will continue to use military and paramilitary forces to apply pressure to Southeast Asian littoral states (particularly the Philippines and Vietnam) as it seeks to undermine their territorial claims and reinforce its own.

Safeguarding China’s maritime rights and interests

The White Paper defines the role of the PLA in defending the ‘waters, islands and reefs in the East China Sea, the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea’. It notes that the military will continue to ‘resolutely respond to security threats, infringements and provocations’. The longstanding military presence of the US, Australia, New Zealand, France, the UK and others in the region directly challenges Xi’s ambitions, including his desire to enforce a new brand of rules and norms that support China’s interests. Beijing will continue unsafe military behaviour to challenge foreign militaries and deter their presence. If foreign militaries no longer undertake freedom-of-navigation and overflight activities, China will have the freedom to write new rules and norms for the region.

China shows great flexibility in adapting its military tactics in response to changes in regional and strategic dynamics. For example, in April 2024, former US Indo-Pacific Commander, Admiral John Aquilino, told reporters that China’s unsafe interactions with the US military had declined. However, he also noted that this was probably a temporary decision as China looked to stabilise its military sphere and focus on revitalising its slowing economy. However, the PLA continues to conduct unsafe manoeuvres in the vicinity of US allies’ forces operating in the region.

China’s tactics may change, but Xi’s strategy doesn’t. Several factors, including economic, domestic and global events, will influence how China’s military tactics evolve to strengthen its global position. Based on current trends, we may see the following tactics in the future.

Greater efforts to deter US partners’ military activity in the region

While China’s military has temporarily softened its approach towards US military assets in the region, unsafe interactions have continued against Australia, the Philippines and others. Countries with smaller militaries and economies are easier targets for China. While Beijing will be more circumspect as to how and when it challenges the US, it will continue to target the militaries of less militarily powerful countries to deter their presence in the region.

Greater efforts to challenge US partnerships in the region

China’s leaders regularly speak out against the formation of US-led ‘exclusive blocs’. The PRC is likely to use military tactics to challenge US allies and partners and undermine Washington’s regional security partnerships. In August 2024, a Chinese military plane violated Japanese airspace for the first time. That action took place at a time when Japan is strengthening its security relationship with the US and is increasingly working with the US in minilateral groups, including a trilateral grouping with South Korea and the Quad with Australia and India. The advent of a new US administration will provide a fresh opportunity for Beijing to test Washington’s partnerships and alliances.

Increasing pressure on regional countries by further eroding UNCLOS

Beijing will be likely to use new legal tactics, enforced by the PLA, to further erode UNCLOS and apply pressure on regional countries. In November 2024, China declared straight baselines around the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. It could continue that trend by enforcing straight baselines around the Spratly Islands. Doing so would allow the PRC to strengthen its sovereignty claims in the Spratlys while further undermining UNCLOS. UNCLOS doesn’t permit unilateral determinations. That would present a challenge to regional countries but also be a real test of China’s enforcement capabilities, given the size of the archipelago and number of countries with outposts there.